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Abstract
Considering the world’s IoT development and market, it is necessary to guarantee the se-
curity of the developed IoT applications as well as the privacy of their end users. In this
sense, Federated Identity Management (FIdM) systems can be of great help as they improve
user authentication and privacy. In this paper, we claim that traditional FIdM are mostly
cumbersome and then ill-suited for IoT. As a solution to this problem, we come up with a
federated identity authentication protocol exclusively tailored to IoT. Federated Lightweight
Authentication of Things (FLAT), our solution, replaces weighty protocols and asymmetric
cryptographic primitives used in traditional FIdM by lighter ones. For instance, FLAT syner-
gistically combines symmetric cryptosystems and Implicit Certificates. The results show that
FLAT can reduce the data exchange overhead by around 31% when compared to a baseline
solution. FLAT’s Client is also more efficient than the baseline solution in terms of data trans-
mitted, data received, total data exchange, and computation time. Our results indicate that
FLAT runs efficiently even on top of resource-constrained devices like Arduino.
Keywords: Internet of Things, authentication, federated identity management
1. Introduction
The development of the Internet of Things (IoT) Atzori et al. (2010); Gubbi et al. (2013);
Borgia (2014) is a national priority in several countries around the world and is significantly
impacting our society. Studies suggest that we will be surrounded by around 20 billion IoT
devices in 20201. The IoT development has enabled a diverse number of applications in
academy and industry.
When it comes to IoT, one of the most significant challenges to its full realization lies in
the field of Identity Management (IdM). IdM refers to the identification of users in a given
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system (e.g., a network, application, or service) and controlling their access to resources within
that system. (Here, the term identification means the process for authenticating the identity
of a user Stallings (2016).). Ideally, IdM provides administrators with the tools to manage the
full user’s identity life-cycle (e.g., setup, maintenance, and tear down) and, thus, are vital to
the security and productivity of organizations.
Figure 1: Traditional FIdM (adapted from Birrell and Schneider (2013), Figure 2).
Federated Identity Management (FIdM) Shim et al. (2005), in turn, improves the IdM idea
by enabling a domain to control accesses to its resources from external users. For instance,
it allows an external user to authenticate to a local server and utilize its services without
having to create an identity or register credentials locally. Instead, the authentication process
between the user and the Service Provider (SP) is mediated by the Identity Provider (IdP) of
the user’s home domain. FIdM, hence:
• enables applications like Single-Sign-On (SSO);
• increases privacy by limiting the amount of information shared;
• and improves the end-users experience and security by eliminating the need for new
accounts registration and restricting the number of entities that hold their password.
Fig. 1 illustrates how traditional FIdM works. The Client initiates the communication
with the SP (Fig. 1, step 1). The SP, in turn, redirects the Client to the IdP (step 2). Next,
the Client requests an assertion (or token) to the IdP (step 3) and authenticates itself to the
IdP by presenting its credentials (steps 4 and 5). The IdP, in exchange, sends the assertion
to the Client (step 6). This assertion is then used by the Client to get access to the SP
service (steps 7 and 8). All these steps are normally protected and authenticated by public
key infrastructure certificates, which have to be validated by all participants.
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So far, unfortunately, IoT technology cannot fully enjoy the benefits of either IdM or
FIdM. This is so because both IdM or FIdM widely adopted approaches are inadequate to
IoT Fremantle et al. (2014). First and foremost, there is no such thing as IdM for IoT devices.
Instead, in existing (F)IdM schemes, IoT devices make use of credentials of individual (human)
users to log on and enjoy domain services. And this is both insecure and inappropriate as,
respectively, devices most likely should not have the same clearance level as those users and
some IoT devices just cannot be naturally linked to any individual user (e.g., whose user
should a traffic light be?). Second, the IoT mobile nature and dynamics urge a higher level
of scalability and interoperability across multiple domains when compared to conventional
network elements Fremantle et al. (2014). And last but not least, the authentication process on
existing (F)IdM schemes normally build upon the login/password paradigm, which is usually
okay for humans but ill-suited for devices Fremantle and Aziz (2016), and leverage expensive
RSA/DSA cryptosystems, hence, incurring significant computational resources overhead Perrig
et al. (2002). So, there is patently a dire need for a FIdM able to meet IoT special needs.
As a solution to this problem, we propose a FIdM protocol exclusively tailored to IoT.
In short, we design, developed, and evaluate a prototype of such a protocol. Our solution,
called Federated Lightweight Authentication of Things (FLAT) Santos et al. (2018), replaces
cumbersome protocols and asymmetric (public-key) cryptosystems used in traditional FIdM
by more efficient ones and, thus, well-suited for IoT 2. Notably, FLAT synergistically combines
symmetric cryptosystems and Implicit Certificates Brown et al. (2002) to come up with a fed-
erated authentication protocol. We built a prototype of FLAT and evaluated its performance.
This paper is organized as follows. We first argue the need for lightweight cross-domain
authentication schemes (Section 2). Next, we present how FLAT meet this need (Section 3).
We describe FLAT development (Section 4), discuss its performance figures (Section 5), and
then sum up our findings (Section 7).
2. The Call for a Lightweight Cross-domain Authentication
There are many situations when IoT nodes from different domains need to talk to each
other in a secure manner. A real-world situation that came to our attention by way of one of
the biggest technology company is this: Suppose that an autonomous (driverless) truck that
hauls iron ore has gotten out of order in the middle of a mine3. And that a technical rescue
team has to provide in-situ emergency care in order to get the truck fixed. To do so, ideally,
the rescue team needs its technical apparatus to communicate seamlessly with the truck’s
engine to start providing assistance. Note, here, we have devices (the engine and the technical
equipment) from distinct domains (the mining company and the technical rescue company)
that need to inter-operate as soon as possible (as this truck broken down may nearly lead to
million-dollar losses per day) and in an authenticated manner (because a truck like this is very
expensive and cannot be accessed by someone or something it does not recognize).
Another example of such a need is automated cashless toll systems. Here, cars (clients) are
equipped with tags that automatically authenticates to the toll gate, authorizing the car to
get into the tollway after processing the payment. Note, however, that a plain implementation
2Santos et al. Santos et al. (2018) present the general concept of FLAT and preliminary results of the solution.
3https://www.technologyreview.com/s/603170/mining-24-hours-a-day-with-robots/
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of such a system (i.e., without the employment of FIdM or other security countermeasures
to protect privacy) is inappropriate to both car users and tollway companies. The system is
inappropriate to the user because it trades privacy for convenience4. For instance, it makes it
possible for the toll company to keep track of the users’ mobility pattern and then infer part
of users daily routine. And the system is also inappropriate to the toll company because it
may not comply with contemporary data privacy laws (e.g., The EU General Data Protection
Regulation).
Note the employment of a FIdM system could easily solve the above privacy issue were
it not for the resources it requires. For instance, one of the most popular protocol for cross-
domain message exchange, the Security Assertion Markup Language (SAML) Maler and Reed
(2008), relies on asymmetric cryptography and then is inadequate to the IoT scenario, due
to the computational resources required. There are indeed streamlined FIdM proposals, some
even tailored to IoT (e.g., Fremantle and Aziz (2016), Cirani et al. (2015), Domenech et al.
(2016)). However, those proposals still require asymmetric operations from Clients and, there-
fore, are not ideal for resource-constrained environments. So, the major challenge for solving
the privacy issue lies in designing a FIdM that fits the resources of IoT devices.
3. FLAT: A Federated Lightweight Authentication Protocol for IoT
FLAT adapts the traditional FIdM authentication to achieve a federated lightweight au-
thentication solution for IoT. In what follows, we talk about the FLAT various assumptions
(Section 3.1), present FLAT itself (Section 3.2), discuss FLAT design decision making (Sec-
tion 3.3), and then present FLAT message description (Section 3.4).
3.1. Assumptions
FLAT focus on a critical part of a FIdM model: authentication. For other parts, FLAT
assumes the use of existing approaches. Below, we describe FLAT assumptions.
3.1.1. Device capability
FLAT assumes the Client, SP, and IdP will be run over devices of low, medium, and high
computational capabilities, respectively. This is so because:
• IoT devices are normally resource-constrained, making the Client the main motivation
of our work;
• the SP, in the end, is still a kind of server and, most likely, will be endowed with more
resources than the Client;
• and the IdP is probably like any other IdPs, i.e., a Cloud server that will run 24/7.
By definition, IoT devices are interconnected via the Internet. As for the Client, this can be
done either through the devices’ own capabilities (e.g., by featuring a mobile chip like modern
e-book readers/smartwatches usually do) or indirectly by requiring the device to connect to a
4https://www.theverge.com/2013/3/27/4150702/golden-gate-bridges-new-cashless-tollway-promises-
convenience-for-privacy
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hotspot close to the SP. After obtaining the SP service broadcast, the Client could also ask the
SP to forward its packets to the IdP, as it is expected that the SP is permanently connected
to the Internet.
3.1.2. Service Discovery
Service discovery allows participants of a network to do things like service announcement
and consultation Ververidis and Polyzos (2008). In IoT, devices use services provided by SPs
physically close to them and, thus, SPs convey service information using beacons,i.e., period-
ically broadcasted messages within a certain radius. FLAT assumes that the Client discovers
the SP and its services using beacons.
3.1.3. Trust Establishment
FLAT assumes the trust between IdPs and Clients as well as IdPs and SPs takes place a
priori. FLAT assumes the trust between IdPs and Clients is established during a Client setup,
where shared symmetric keys are pre-loaded into IdPs and Clients.
As for IdPs and SPs, they are normally from different domains and, previously, not known
to each other. FLAT assumes the trust between them derives from digital certificates issued
by a common Certification Authority.
3.1.4. Interfederation
In case the Client tries to use a service offered in a different federation, FLAT assumes
a model based on the GÉANT Authorisation INfrastructure for the research and education
community (eduGAIN)5 for communication between different federations. eduGAIN is an
interfederation service that allows the connection of academic identity federations and their
respective infrastructures for authentication and authorization. The interfederation can be
seen as a way of making certificates issued by one federation Certification Authority valid in
another federation. This is done through cross-certification or the creation of a new root Certi-
fication Authority that will issue certificates for the Certification Authorities of all participant
federations.
3.1.5. Setup
FLAT assumes that a number of procedures will take place prior to the Clients deploy-
ment. A central point for security is the generation of cryptographic keys. Physical Unclonable
Functions (PUFs) are known to be resistant to physical attacks. FLAT, therefore, assumes
the use of PUFs for generating the device’s cryptographic keys Suh and Devadas (2007). In
FLAT, briefly, we assume the PUF output is generated, formatted and stored in each device,
shared with the IdP and then used as a key to secure the Client↔IdP communication. We
assume this whole process takes place in a secure environment (e.g., at a physically secure
room inside the device’s home domain.)
5https://www.geant.org/Services/Trust_identity_and_security/eduGAIN
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Figure 2: FLAT applied to a tollway scenario.
3.2. Description
Fig. 2 shows a high-level overview of FLAT‘s operation. For readability, we decided not
to represent all the cryptographic primitives in Fig. 2, individually. There, instead, dotted
lines denote no cryptosystem being used, dashed lines denote symmetric cryptosystems (MACs
and secret-key encryption), and solid lines, asymmetric cryptosystems (digital signatures and
public-key encryption).
We use a scenario where a car with an attached constrained IoT device interacts with an
automated cashless toll system to illustrate FLAT (Fig. 2). Here, the toll company represents
the SP; the device attached to the car, the Client; and the car domain (the car rental company,
the car company owner, the department of motor vehicles etc.) the IdP. In context, the service
here is the tollway, i.e., the passage through the toll road. Broadly, the Client requests to its
IdP a session key and an assertion. The IdP, in turn, sends securely the session key to both
the Client and SP. Besides, the IdP sends a signed assertion to the Client. Last, the Client
uses the session key to secure the communication with the SP and forward the signed assertion
to be validated by it in order to allow access to the requested service.
Notably, whenever the Client wants to access a service (e.g., go through a toll gate ), it
requests the IdP to issue a key to the SP and the Client itself (Fig. 2, step 1), so the Client and
SP can communicate with each other, securely. The IdP respond to this request and issues
the key to the Client (Fig. 2, step 2) and SP (Fig. 2, steps 3, 4, and 5). Regarding the SP,
this is a three-hand shake process because the SP and IdP first exchange certificates (in this
case, Implicit Certificates – Fig. 2, steps 3 and 4) to establish a secure channel for the key
issuing (Fig. 2, step 5). Next, as usual in FIdM, the Client requests and receives an assertion
(Fig. 2, step 6 and 7). Last, the Client requests the service by presenting the assertion to the
SP (Fig. 2, step 8), then the SP provides the service (Fig. 2, step 9) – e.g., by opening the toll
6
Operation(Client C, Identity Provider IdP , Service Provider SP )
1.1. C → IdP : Mac(kIdP,C, nC | SP | key_req )
2.1. IdP → SP : nIdP | certIdP
2.2. SP → IdP : Sign(SSP, certSP | nIdP | nSP | n’SP )
2.3. IdP → SP : Sign(SIdP, Enc(PSP, kSP,C ) | nSP | n’IdP )
2.4. SP → IdP : Sign(SSP, n’IdP )
1.2. IdP → C : Mac(kIdP,C, Enc(kIdP,C, kSP,C ) | ‘serv[1...n]’ | nC | n”IdP )
3.1. C → IdP : Mac(kIdP,C, Enc(kIdP,C, assert_req(‘serv[i]’) ) | n”IdP | n’C)
3.2. IdP → C : Mac(kIdP,C, Enc(kIdP,C, assert = Sign(SIdP,‘serv[i]’ | n’SP )) | n’C)
4.1. C → SP : Mac(kSP,C, Enc(kSP,C, assert ) | n”C | n’SP )
4.2. SP → C : Mac(kSP,C, Enc(kSP,C, serv[i] ) | n”C)
The symbols denote:
→: unicast transmission
| : concatenation
Mac(k, m) : MAC over m calculated using key k
kX,Y : symmetric key shared by X and Y
nX : nonce generated by X
key_req : key request label
assert_req : assert request label
certX : X’s certificate
SX : X’s private key
PX : X’s public key
Sign(k, m) : signature over message m using key k
Enc(k, m) : encryption over message m using key k
‘serv[1...n]’: list of services
‘serv[i]’: description of service i
serv[i]: service i
assert: assertion
Protocol 1: FLAT protocol description.
gate.
Protocol 1 shows the complete description of FLAT, with all steps taken in the authentica-
tion process. First, Client sends a key request to IdP, indicating the SP providing the service
it would like to access (step 1.1, Protocol 1). The IdP then exchange certificates with the SP
(steps 2.1 and 2.2, Protocol 1) and after verifying SP’s certificate, sends a symmetric key to
the SP, so it will be able to communicate with the Client (step 2.3, Protocol 1). The SP sends
a signed nonce to the IdP as a confirmation of the reception of the key (step 2.4, Protocol 1).
Next, the IdP also sends the symmetric key to the Client (step 1.2, Protocol 1). The Client
can then send an assertion request to the IdP (step 3.1, Protocol 1), that responds with the
assertion (step 3.2, Protocol 1). This assertion signed by the IdP will be forwarded to the SP
(step 4.1, Protocol 1), that will then be able to provide the service to the Client (step 4.2,
Protocol 1).
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3.3. Design Highlights
3.3.1. Efficiency
In FLAT, we have taken some measurements to guarantee the efficiency of the protocol,
especially on the Client side. First, we decided that all communication involving the Client —
the most constrained device — will be carried out by using symmetric cryptosystems. These
are more efficient than asymmetric cryptosystems regarding not only computation but also
communication (e.g., they do not require certificate exchange). To make this come true and,
yet, secure the communication between the Client and SP we use the IdP as a Key Distribution
Center, or KDC for short.
Second, we tried to decrease the message exchange load on the Client side. By way of
example, instead of the Client first contacting the SP (Fig. 1, step 1) for only then being
redirected to the IdP (Fig. 1, step 3), Clients, in FLAT, start by directly contacting the
IdP (Fig. 2, step 1) as soon as it gets the SP service announcement. (Recall we assume
Clients get aware of the SP and the services it provides through the use of Service Discovery
– c.f. Section 3.1, Service Discovery.)
Last, FLAT replaces conventional certificates with Implicit Certificates Brown et al. (2002)
— also known as Elliptic Curve Qu-Vanstone (ECQV) — during the SP-IdP communication
(Fig. 2, steps 3 and 4). Implicit Certificates reconstructs public keys from public information
and, hence, there is no need of explicitly storing them in certificates. This, in turn, reduces
the sizes of the certificates and then saves bandwidth. Further, the certificate verification in
this cryptosystem is performed implicitly which, in turn, makes it more efficient, too. (For
detailed information on Implicit Certificates, please refer to Brown et al. (2002).).
3.3.2. Security
Threat Model – We assume that the adversary has access to the messages exchanged in
the protocol, i.e., she can eavesdrop, collect, modify and replay messages previously sent in
the protocol. We also consider that the attacker might have physical access to the devices.
In order to mitigate risks related to the phyhsical access, as mentioned in Section 3.1, the
device’s key is generated using PUFs. We also assume there is a secure channel to transmit
the symmetric key shared between Client and IdP in the setup phase.
Table 1: Countermeasures adopted by FLAT.
Property Countermeasure
Authenticity MACs and digital signatures
Confidentiality Symmetric and asymmetric encryption
Liveness Nonces
Integrity MACs, digital signatures and PUFs
Availability Authentication between the parties
Privacy FIdM model: limit the access to identity information
FLAT uses (i) Message Authentication Codes (MACs) and digital signatures for providing
both authentication and integrity; (ii) ciphers for confidentiality; and (iii) nonces for liveness,
i.e., for preventing replay-attacks Stallings (2016). Table 1 summarizes the countermeasures
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adopted by FLAT in order to reduce the possibilities of attacks related to each of the security
properties.
Authenticity – FLAT uses MACs and digital signatures to ensure authenticity in its
communications. In Client ↔ IdP communication, FLAT relies on a pre-shared symmetric
key. When the IdP sends a message to Client using this key, Client knows it is its IdP, since
only the IdP has access to the symmetric key shared through a secure channel in the pre-
deployment stage. The same applies to the case when the Client is sending a message to its
IdP. The symmetric key is also used in MACs that protect the messages being exchanged and
ensures its authenticity. Regarding the IdP ↔ SP communication, it starts with a certificate
exchange. As both SP and IdP certificates are signed by a common CA, they can be verified
by both entities. When the SP receives a message signed by the IdP and verifies it using the
certificate’s public key, the SP knows it was really the IdP who sent the message. Similarly,
the IdP can verify the authenticity of the messages sent by the SP. Communication between
Client and SP also makes use of a symmetric key distributed by the IdP to both SP and Client.
The authenticity of messages sent between Client and SP is ensured by MACs.
SP’s certificate sent in step 2.2, Protocol 1 is included within the signature. This signature
is not necessary, as the certificate bears the CA’s signature. This certificate was included in the
signature for the sake of readability. FLAT uses implicit certificates (ECQV) to authenticate
IdP ↔ SP communication. The implicit certificate scheme is considered secure16, i.e., an
attacker is not able to successfully falsify an implicit certificate and a private key that was not
issued by a legitimate CA Brown et al. (2009).
Confidentiality – In order to protect the confidentiality of the messages containing sensi-
tive information, FLAT uses symmetric encryption in Client↔ IdP and Client↔ SP commu-
nication, and also asymmetric encryption in IdP↔ SP communication. Messages not carrying
sensitive information, such as nonces and certificates, are not encrypted. FLAT mitigates the
possibility of message eavesdropping, since messages containing sensitive information are en-
crypted, and thus, even if an attacker is able to intercept one of FLAT’s messages, she will
not be able to decrypt its contents. FLAT also adopts countermeasures to prevent Man-In-
The-Middle attacks (MITM), by requiring proof that they are really whom they claim to be
during the communication. In FLAT’s operation, the IdP ↔ SP communication is authen-
ticated through the use of digital signatures, with certificate exchange before the shared key
is sent to the SP. Additionally, Client’s identity is confirmed by the IdP and vice-versa, by
the pre-shared symmetric key. Client ↔ SP communication is also authenticated since their
identities have already been verified by the IdP before the shared symmetric key was sent to
each of them.
Liveness – FLAT uses in its operation randomly generated nonces to ensure the liveness
of the messages being sent. Thus, even in case an attacker is able to intercept a message and
replays it, the attack will not be successful since the liveness of the message can be verified
by the nonces. FLAT also uses a nonce to identify the session with the SP. Besides ensuring
the liveness of the message, the nonce n′_SP (received by the IdP in step 2.2, Protocol 1) is
sent to the Client (step 3.2, Protocol 1), so when the SP will receive this message (step 4.1,
Protocol 1) it will know the message refers to the same service request made in the previous
steps. Although it is an unlikely possibility, if an attacker has access to a large number of
messages and one of the nonces is repeated at some time, she might be able to perform an
attack using an old message. For the sake of readability, nonce encryption is suppressed from
the protocol description.
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Integrity – FLAT uses MACs and digital signatures to ensure the integrity of the messages.
In Client↔ IdP and Client↔ SP communication MACs are used to provide authenticity and
integrity to the messages. IdP ↔ SP communication is protected using digital signatures
to guarantee non-repudiation, authenticity, and integrity to the messages being exchanged.
FLAT’s adopted countermeasure to protect against tampering and MITM attacks to integrity
is to use MACs or digital signatures, as explained before. To protect against physical tamper-
ing, FLAT uses PUFs to generate keys. Thus, even if a physical tampering will occur in the
IoT device, there will be changes in its behavior and the key generation will be compromised.
In this case, it will not be possible to communicate with the IdP and the protocol will not
run.
Availability – Availability ensures that the system will be available when the users will
need it.Note that in FLAT the Service Discovery (Section 3.1, Service Discovery) precedes
any authentication. Therefore, bogus service advertisement messages can be received by the
Client. A fake SP doing such advertising will not have a proper certificate. As the protocol
runs by, however, the IdP will eventually figure this out (Fig. 2, steps 3 and 4) and then
abort the communication with the source of these advertisements. Thus, the IdP will neither
provide the SP with a session key nor the Client with a signed assertion for the required
service. Therefore, the Client will be protected by its IdP against fake SPs.
Privacy – FLAT increases privacy by limiting the number of entities that hold the device’s
identity information by only its own IdP, as it adopts the federated model. This model also
increases privacy as it allows the devices to limit the identity information that they would like
to share with the SPs.
Figure 3: FLAT Message description.
3.4. Message description.
The message used in FLAT is shown in Fig. 3. The first byte is used for message type – in
FLAT, there are ten message types, namely: key request, Client key, certificate-challenge,
certificate-response, SP key, key acknowledgment, assertion request, assertion, service
request, and service. The second byte is used for storing the sequence number. The fol-
lowing two fields have three bytes each and are reserved to store the source and destination
identifiers in the application layer. Hence, FLAT supports domains up to 224 (≈ 16 million)
clients in size. Next, we have a two-byte field to store the payload size. Recipients use this
field to get to know the amount of data they should read. Last, we set a payload of at most
280 bytes so that FLAT can accommodate data and cryptographic elements typical of an IoT
secure communication protocol.
4. Development
We developed a prototype of FLAT. The prototype comprises three modules: Client, SP,
and IdP. Both our Client and SP modules are efficient enough to be run on top of resource-
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constrained IoT devices like Arduino. The IdP, conversely, is supposed to be hosted on a
server-like device. This is so because we envision the IdP being the single identity provider
for all IoT devices in a given domain.
Figure 4: Client’s finite-state machine-like implementation.
Broadly, our development involved four stages: (i) the development of the communication
functions, (ii) the implementation of the cryptosystems, (iii) the integration of the communi-
cation functions and the cryptosystems, (iv) the port of the integration to Arduino.
4.1. Communication
The communication functions have been developed using the Arduino Wi-Fi library in
C/C++. When an Arduino Wi-Fi Shield is attached to an Arduino board, this library makes
message transmission using Wi-Fi (802.11b/g) possible. The library provides both UDP and
TCP protocols. FLAT was built on top of UDP and was developed based on the idea of a
finite-state machine (Fig. 4) going through each step of the authentication protocol. If the
synchronization between any pair of interlocutors is lost during the protocol, the process can
be restarted through the transmission of a special message.
4.2. Cryptography
All asymmetric cryptosystems used in FLAT are based on Elliptic Curve Cryptography
(ECC), as they incur less computation, communication, and storage overhead and therefore
suit better the IoT world Stallings (2016). Precisely, we use Elliptic Curve Digital Signatures
(ECDSA) and the Elliptic Curve Integrated Encryption Scheme (ECIES) as opposed to their
traditional counterparts DSA and RSA Stallings (2016).
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Figure 5: FLAT architecture.
We used RELIC6 as an underlying cryptographic library. On top of RELIC, we imple-
mented higher-level cryptosystems like Implicit Certificates. Besides, the toolkit already im-
plemented more common cryptosystems needed in FLAT like ECDSA, ECIES, AES, and
HMAC. Respectively, FLAT employs these cryptosystems for digitally signing, asymmetri-
cally encrypting, symmetrically encrypting, and message authentication.
4.3. Security level
Our development of FLAT offers, approximately, a 128-bit security level. In the symmetric
part, we have AES using 128-bit keys and HMAC using the hash SHA-256 as a cryptographic
hash function. In the asymmetric part—here, all based on ECC—we have the BN-254 elliptic
6https://github.com/relic-toolkit
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curve as the foundation of the cryptosystems7.
4.4. Architecture
Fig. 5 shows the architecture of FLAT, i.e., the modules (Client, SP, and IdP) and submod-
ules (communication and cryptography) that comprise our solution. On the Client module,
there are only symmetric cryptosystems (AES and HMAC). On the SP and IdP modules,
besides the symmetric components, there are also asymmetric cryptosystems (Implicit Certifi-
cates, ECDSA, and ECIES).
(a) (b)
Figure 6: FLAT demo: access (a) granted and (b) denied.
4.5. Demonstration
We developed a demo to showcase our FLAT prototype by demonstrating the functional-
ities of our architecture and executing operations on multiple classes of devices. Our demo
covers the authentication part of FLAT applied to a toy cashless tollway similar to that de-
scribed in Section 2. We say toy because we run FLAT over a mock-up tollway comprised of
a toy car and toy gate. (Fig. 6).
In our demo, a car (client) runs FLAT and tries to authenticate to a toll gate (SP) by
using an assertion supplied by its own domain. If the authentication is successful, a green
LED lights, the toll gate opens, and the car is granted access to the tollway. Otherwise, red
LED lights, the gate keeps closed, and the car’s access to the tollway is denied.
The Client, SP, and IdP have been respectively instantiated by an Arduino Due (84 MHz
Atmel, 96 KB SRAM, 512 KB flash), a Raspberry Pi (Raspberry Pi zero W ARM1176JZF-S
1GHz single-core, 512MB RAM), and a Laptop Dell Inspiron (Intel Core i7 2.7 GHz, 8 GB
7Until recently, this curve was thought to offer a 128-bit security level; it offers a 100-bit, though Barbulescu
and Duquesne (2017). The curve can be changed to a more secure one.
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RAM). They correspond to our vision that roles in FLAT will be played by heterogeneous
devices (c.f. Section 3.1) . For communication, the Arduino board is equipped with an Ar-
duino Wi-Fi shield (802.11b/g), and a MikroTik router plays the role of an access point. For
controlling the toll gate, we used a Tower Pro servo motor 9G SG90. Last, we employ some
LED bulbs to signal access granted or denied.
5. Results
We have evaluated FLAT authentication protocol in terms of computation, communication,
protocol total run-time, SRAM and storage, and scalability. For simplicity, we will refer to the
authentication protocol as FLAT in this section. Here, our performance numbers correspond
to the average value of 100 runs.
Unless otherwise noticed, the numbers for the Client, SP, and IdP in this section refer
to numbers measured by running FLAT on top of the demo hardware configuration, namely:
Arduino Due, Raspberry Pi, and Laptop Dell Inspiron – c.f. Section 4.5 for details.
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Figure 7: SRAM costs.
5.1. RAM & Storage
We make use of another protocol as a starting point for some comparisons and call it
baseline. The baseline is similar to a traditional FIdM protocol (Fig. 1) and does not use
Implicit Certificates as FLAT does. For fairness, however, we instantiate baseline using the
same parameters as FLAT: certificate fields, level of security, message format, ECC-based
cryptosystems, and so forth. Baseline certificate size is 134 bytes, as opposed to the Implicit
Certificate size used in FLAT which is 70 bytes. This is so because baseline certificate includes,
besides the identification information (in our case, 37 bytes), the public key (32 bytes) and the
Certificate Authority signature (65 bytes). On the other hand, Implicit Certificates require
only the identification information (37 bytes) and the public key extraction data (33 bytes).
We have evaluated FLAT Client requirements regarding SRAM (Fig. 7) and storage. The
results show that FLAT, including the needed Arduino libraries to run the protocol, takes
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around 16% of the Client’s total memory (Arduino, 15.7 KB out of 96 KB of SRAM). As
for storage, FLAT requires 125.8 KB, i.e., around 24% of the Client’s total storage (Arduino,
512 KB of flash), approximately. Notably, Arduino’s native libraries take 73.5 KB, FLAT
communication functions takes 6.8 KB, and cryptography takes 45.5 KB.
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Figure 8: Communication costs.
5.2. Communication
Fig. 8 shows the amount of data sent (Tx) and received (Rx) by the Client, SP, and IdP
in both FLAT and the baseline solution. In total, FLAT exchanges around 500 bytes on
the Client side. It is worth pointing out that the FLAT Client is around 65% more efficient
regarding Tx, Rx, and total data exchanged. Likewise, FLAT, as a whole, is 31% more efficient
than the baseline regarding data exchange (Tx plus Rx). This lower communication overhead
on the Client side is mainly because we use symmetric cryptosystems – they do not require
certificate exchange. FLAT SP is around 9%, 14%, and 12%, respectively, more efficient than
baseline SP, too. These light Client and SP, however, come to a price. To alleviate the Client
and SP, FLAT demands more from the IdP. And then, in FLAT, even using (shorter) Implicit
Certificates, the IdP total message exchange is around 20% higher than in the baseline. We
claim, however, the IdP is a powerful device and, therefore, able to handle the total load.
5.3. Computation
FLAT Client is around 520 times faster than baseline (Fig. 9, Client). There are two main
reasons for that. First, FLAT runs solely symmetric cryptosystems on the Client side. In the
baseline, on the other hand, the Client needs to compute the following asymmetric operations:
ECIES encryption (1 time), ECIES decryption (1), ECDSA signature (2) and ECDSA signa-
ture verification (5). And while symmetric operations are known to be negligible Perrig et al.
(2002)—even in resource-constrained devices—, asymmetric operations—even ECC-based—
are known to be inefficient Malan et al. (2008). Second, the Client delegates several tasks to
the SP and IdP. A disadvantage of the second reason, however, is that the FLAT SP and IdP
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end up being 4% and 2% less computationally efficient than baseline, respectively. But this is
a very small price to pay compared to the gains obtained on other fronts.
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Figure 10: Total protocol run-time.
5.4. Total Run-time
We have measured the total amount of time that takes to run FLAT—i.e., around 65 ms
(Fig. 10)—and compared that to the baseline solution. Our results show that FLAT total
run-time is, on average, only a fraction (around 4%) of the baseline total run-time (Fig. 10).
This is a direct consequence of the computation (Section 5.3) and communication (Section 5.2)
numbers previously shown, i.e., FLAT exchanges fewer and smaller messages as well as requires
significantly less computational work from the Client.
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Notably, the fact that FLAT is computationally more efficient in the slow part of the
protocol (Client – Section 5.3) — and only slightly less (4% and 2%) in the fast part (SP and
IdP, respectively) — helps in improving its total run-time speedup compared to the baseline
solution.
5.5. Scalability
Besides, FLAT scales smoothly regarding the number of Clients. If the number of Clients
gets too large for a given IdP, we only need to create one more IdP—certified by the same
Certificate Authority—and redistribute the Clients among them, evenly. Of course, this could
be done in any federation. However, in FLAT, this process is very simple, as we can adopt a
limit on the number of clients that an IdP can attend and, if such limit is reached, another
IdP would be installed. New clients would be communicating with this new IdP, without any
changes to the previous configuration.
6. Related Work
FIdM is already a consolidated solution in the traditional Internet, with several standards
and protocols being widely used, such as Shibboleth, OpenID and OAuth. Several works
address the authentication and authorization issue for the traditional Internet (e.g. Steiner
et al. (1988); Shim et al. (2005); Maler and Reed (2008); Chadwick (2009); Chadwick and
Inman (2009); Birrell and Schneider (2013); Isaakidis et al. (2016); Miettinen et al. (2016);
Zuo et al. (2017)).
However, considering the IoT scenario, there is still no consensus on how to provide au-
thentication and authorization to users and devices. In this sense, different IdM solutions for
IoT have been proposed (Wang and Wang (2014); Xi et al. (2016); Neto et al. (2016); Kim
et al. (2017a); Li et al. (2018)).
Wang et al. Wang andWang (2014) propose a two-factor authentication scheme for wireless
sensor networks that can provide privacy protection to users. They analyze case studies to
show that previous approaches to the privacy issue in wireless sensor networks are not able
to fully address the problem. They investigate possible solutions, concluding that public key
cryptography is a suitable approach.
Xi et al. Xi et al. (2016) present a key agreement and authentication protocol for IoT
devices named TDS (The Dancing Signals). The designed solution provides faster key gener-
ation when compared to other solutions, and is resistant to predictable channel attacks. TDS
is modeled to only provide keys to physically close devices.
Neto et al. Neto et al. (2016) propose an authentication and access control solution for
each step in the life-cycle of IoT devices. Using attribute and identity-based cryptography,
they developed several protocols to enable Attribute-based access control (ABAC) and au-
thentication in IoT environments. The proposed solution can be run in both powerful and
constrained devices.
Hammi et al. Hammi et al. (2018) present an authentication solution for IoT named
"Bubbles of Trust". Their approach is to provide authentication using a decentralized system
based on blockchain in order to ensure availability and integrity. Their solution is evaluated
in an implementation using Ethereum blockchain.
Zeng et al. Zeng et al. (2018) propose a multi-server approach to provide anonymous user
authentication for IoT devices. They also performed a security evaluation of the solution.
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Kumari et al. Kumari et al. (2018) present an ECC-based authentication protocol targeted
to IoT and cloud servers. Their solution is evaluated in terms of performance and its security
is formally analyzed using the AVISPA tool.
Ometov et al. Ometov et al. (2019) provides a comparison between different multi-factor
authentication solutions for IoT, listing its advantages and disadvantages.
Some authentication and authorization proposals for IoT are based on (F)IdM solutions
for the traditional Internet Liu et al. (2012); Fremantle et al. (2014); Cirani et al. (2015);
Fremantle and Aziz (2016); Domenech et al. (2016)). The main advantage of such solutions is
that they allow integration with traditional FIdM systems while trying to reduce the costs of
these solutions by changing some aspects of the original approach.
Liu et al. Liu et al. (2012) design an architecture for authentication and authorization in
IoT. The authors briefly discuss existing IdM approaches and opt for ECC-based PKC with
OpenID for the authentication and RBAC for authorization. The authors also provide a brief
security analysis of the proposed solution.
Fremantle et al. Fremantle et al. (2014) propose a federated identity model to provide
access control to IoT devices, evaluating the possibility of an authentication and authorization
model for IoT based on OAuth 2.0 with the MQTT protocol. In another work, Fremantle et
al. (Fremantle and Aziz, 2016) propose an extension to the OAuth 2.0 protocol to provide
a FIdM solution for IoT devices, as well as enhance the privacy of users. Their solution is
called OAuthing and enables users and devices to be registered automatically, providing each
user/device anonymous identities.
Cirani et al. Cirani et al. (2015) propose an authorization architecture for IoT using an
external authorization service based on OAuth, called IoT-OAS. Their architecture transfers
the authorization logic from the constrained device to the external service, allowing the de-
vice or smart object to protect its resources by only making a request to the authorization
framework.
Domenech et al. Domenech et al. (2016) describe an authentication and authorization
model for IoT based on SAML and XACML standards, the AAI4WoT. The authors provide a
prototype as well as an evaluation in terms of storage, communication, CPU usage, and power
consumption.
These works develop solutions based on traditional FIdM approaches. FLAT, however, is
not based on existing FIdM solutions for the traditional Internet, being exclusively tailored to
IoT.
There are solutions which approach the authentication and authorization issue in IoT
through asymmetric cryptography B. Oliveira et al. (2009); Yavuz (2013); Porambage et al.
(2014).
Oliveira et al. B. Oliveira et al. (2009) propose a solution to provide end-to-end authen-
tication between a sensor node and multiple users. They claim that given the number of
applications that a sensor can be connected, the use of digital signatures is the most suitable
option to provide end-to-end authentication. They evaluated both ECDSA and BLS signature
algorithms in constrained devices, showing the feasibility of the proposed solution.
Yavuz Yavuz (2013) proposes a new signature scheme for authentication of resource-
constrained devices called ETA (Efficient and Tiny Authentication). The author claims that
traditional signature schemes are not suitable for constrained devices as they require high
computational power and energy consumption. ETA also provides smaller signatures and key
sizes than other existing similar solutions.
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Table 2: Related work comparison.
Work Symmetric Crypto
on Client
Gateway Client
device
Context Authorization Authentication
Oliveira et al. — — Constrained General — Yes
Horrow et al. 2012 — Yes Constrained General Yes Yes
Liu et al. 2012 — Yes — General Yes Yes
Hummen et al. 2013 — Yes Constrained General — Yes
Yavuz 2013 — — Constrained General — Yes
Porambage 2014 — — Constrained General — Yes
Fremantle et al. 2014 — Yes Constrained General Yes Yes
Wang et al. 2014 — — Constrained General — Yes
Markmann et al. 2015 — Yes Constrained General — Yes
Cirani et al. 2015 — Yes Constrained General Yes —
Witkovski et al. 2015 Yes Yes Constrained Smart home Yes Yes
Fremantle et al. 2016 — Yes Constrained General Yes Yes
Domenech et al. 2016 — Yes Intermediary General Yes Yes
Hong et al. 2016 — Yes Constrained Smart home Yes —
Xi et al. 2016 — Yes Constrained Sensors — Yes
Neto et al. 2016 — — Constrained General Yes Yes
FLAT Yes — Constrained General — Yes
Porambage et al. Porambage et al. (2014) also address the end-to-end authentication be-
tween users and sensors in IoT. The authors present an authentication protocol that takes into
consideration the heterogeneity of the network. Their approach uses asymmetric cryptography
for authentication through the use of implicit certificates, in order to make the solution more
suitable for resource-constrained devices.
These solutions, however, are based on asymmetric cryptography. FLAT, on the other
hand, considers an IoT-tailored protocol for authentication, that makes use of only symmetric
cryptographic primitives in the Client device.
Other works try to transfer the authentication and authorization tasks to an external gate-
way or to a more powerful node in the network, in order to preserve the resource-constrained
IoT devices Horrow and Sardana (2012); Hummen et al. (2013); Turkanović et al. (2014);
Markmann et al. (2015); Kim et al. (2017b).
Horrow and Sardana Horrow and Sardana (2012) present the requirements for an IdM
system for IoT and propose an IdM framework for IoT using cloud-based technologies. Instead
of having computing nodes to process the information sent by sensors, the computation is
performed in the cloud. The authors present a general architecture to approach the identity
management issue in IoT, but they do not describe in details how would be the protocols to
implement this architecture.
Hummen et al. Hummen et al. (2013) propose some optimizations to DTLS in order to use
certificates in IoT devices, such as pre-validation of certificates in a gateway and a delegation
procedure that allows another entity to validate the certificate instead of the constrained de-
vice. However, they present preliminary results and only evaluate the computational overhead,
not addressing other aspects of the solution.
In a short work, Markmann et al. Markmann et al. (2015) approach the authentication
for resource-constrained devices in IoT using Identity-Based Cryptography (IBC) and ECC.
They assume the presence of a node with more computational power in each domain in order
to provide the end-to-end authentication utilizing IBC. This node works as a trusted authority
(similarly to a CA), and a federation of these trusted authorities is required in order to provide
authentication between different domains.
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The solutions proposed by Horrow and Sardana, Hummen et al., and Markmann et al.
make use of another entity to perform authentication and authorization tasks. FLAT, however,
do not transfer the computation to an external entity, developing a protocol that can be
executed even by restricted devices.
There are also works that address FIdM solutions for specific IoT scenarios He and Zeadally
(2015); Witkovski et al. (2015); Hong et al. (2016).
Witkovski et al. Witkovski et al. (2015) propose a solution for IoT device authentication
based on session keys and symmetric cryptography with the use of a gateway to integrate the
traditional Internet and IoT in the maintenance of electronic devices in a smart home scenario.
Hong et al. Hong et al. (2016) claim that Bluetooth Low Energy (BLE) can be used as
an access control alternative in smart homes. A prototype of the BLE access control solution
was built on top of resource-constrained devices and applied to specific smart home scenarios.
Differently from these approaches (targeted to very specific scenarios), FLAT is a broad
solution that can be applied to different IoT scenarios.
Several works propose FIdM solutions for IoT. These solutions, however, do not address
completely the IoT IdM issues, as they are based on IdM solutions for the traditional Internet,
rely on asymmetric cryptography or make use of external entities to perform computational
tasks. FLAT is a federated authentication protocol that can be used to implement a FIdM
system even in restricted devices, as it is based on only symmetric cryptographic primitives
in the Client side.
7. Conclusion
As IoT gains more visibility and IoT solutions are being incorporated in the most diverse
fields, there is a real need to ensure the security of the developed IoT applications and preserve
the privacy of their users.
In this work, we proposed a federated identity authentication protocol exclusively tailored
to IoT called FLAT. FLAT considers that Clients will run over devices of low computational
capabilities and, thus, requires only symmetric (light) cryptographic operations from them.
Besides, FLAT employs Implicit Certificates rather than regular certificates in the IdP↔SP
communication for saving both computation and bandwidth. FLAT also replaces inefficient
cryptosystems like RSA/DSA by others more suitable to IoT and reduces the message load in
the Client device.
This paper presented the assumptions necessary to the correct operation of FLAT, a pro-
totype of the proposed solution applied to a cashless toll system and an evaluation of FLAT
in terms of storage, SRAM, communication, computation, and total run-time.
FLAT computation in the Client is 520 times more efficient than the baseline solution.
FLAT uses around 16% of Client’s SRAM and 24% of Client’s flash memory when running
in an Arduino Due device. Moreover, FLAT total run-time represents 4% of the total time
necessary to run Baseline. Regarding the communication costs, FLAT is also 31% more efficient
than the Baseline protocol when considering the total data exchange. Our results confirm that
FLAT can run efficiently on top of IoT devices.
FLAT is a step towards the development of a complete IdM system that could take care of
all the lifecycle of an IoT device, as it provides an authentication solution that is lightweight,
contemplates the mobility aspect of devices considering different security domains and has an
operational prototype.
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As future works, we consider the development of a complete IdM system. By now, FLAT
is an authentication solution for IoT. The next steps are completing the IdM solution with
the implementations of the authorization, service discovery process, and tear-down.
Another future work includes the proposal and evaluation of different communication pos-
sibilities for the Client device. The Client could use the SP as an intermediate to communicate
with the IdP, using SP’s permanent Internet connection and enabling the Client to only have
a low power Wi-Fi connection. In another possible scenario, the Client will not need a net-
work connection or to communicate directly with the IdP, with the SP resending the messages
between Client and IdP.
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